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From December 5-7, 1997, the International Economic Law
Interest Group ("IELIG") of the American Society of Interna-
tional Law ("ASIL") sponsored a conference on linkages, titled
Linkage as Phenomenon: An Interdisciplinary Approach. While the
fact of linkages between trade and other areas of social concern is
not new,1 the number of linkages asserted, studied, advocated, es-
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As Dr. Frieder Roessler points out in his article, links between trade and
labor, for example, were explicitly recognized at the formation of the post-war
trade system, and this and other links had been discussed considerably earlier. See
also Virginia Leary, Workers' Rights and International Trade, in 2 FAIR TRADE
AND HARMONIZATION 177, 183 (agdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds.,
1996)(notingthe link between trade and labor rights raised in mid-1 8th century);
David P. Fidler, The Globalization of Public Health: Emerging Infectious Diseases
and InternationalRelations, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL L. STUD. 11, 24 (1997) (noting that
the relationship between trade and public health, involving the spreading of
diseases throughinternational commerce, was recognized as early as at least 1851).
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tablished, or resisted has g3rown,2 as has the level of public interest
in trade linkage generally. There is also a growing awareness that
linkage conflicts both conceal and reveal conflicts over fundamen-
tal values at stake in contemporary international economic law
and its intersection with other areas of social concern, as noted in
Jeffrey L. Dunoff's article, 4 raising normative issues which have
been little studied in the international economic law context,5 but
which will have a profound effect on the contours of future inter-
national trade policy and international social policy generally.
For these reasons, the IELIG concluded that the subject of
trade linkages deserved sustained attention, but from a somewhat
uncommon perspective. While many trade linkages have them-
selves been the subject of conferences and symposia, the phe-
nomenon of linkage has not been studied in a sustained compara-
tive fashion across the spectrum of linkage areas. Rather than
simply adding another account of the relationship between trade
and the environment or trade and human rights to the existing
literature, the goal of the conference was to examine linkage itself,
to facilitate a deeper understanding of linkage and what the phe-
nomenon of trade linkages might reveal and presage about inter-
national economic law and international social policy generally.
The Articles appearing in this symposium represent a signifi-
cant contribution towards such an inquiry. Collectively, their
authors suggest that the trade linkage phenomenon is changing
not only the way we understand trade law and policy, but also the
formulation and direction of trade policy itself. The recognition,
assertion, or rejection of particular trade linkages alters the way
we negotiate and design trade rules, the role and nature of interna-
2
For an overview of recent literature concerning the various "trade and" ar-
eas, see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, "Trade and': Recent Developments in Trade Policy and
$cholarsho-And Their SurprisingPoliticallmpdications, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BuS.75,9 (1997).
3 The GATT "Tuna/Dolphin" decisions are widely credited with igniting
public opposition and concern regarding linkage issues and their treatment within
trade law and institutions. See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and
Protection of the Environment: The Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91 AM. J.
INT'L L. 268, 268 nn.1-6 (1997).
4 See also Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 658,
659.60 (1996).
5 See Lea Brilmayer, Trade Policy: The Normative Dimension, 25 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 211 (1993) ('Does trade policy have a normative dimension?
We don't usually think of the issue in those terms.... Trade policy... has
largely escaped the attention of moral critics:).
[Vol 19:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol19/iss2/1
INTRODUCTION
tional economic law institutions' response to linkage issues, the
extent to which the international trading system upholds or de-
feats basic democratic values and calls into question or affirms its
own legitimacy, and the manner in which international economic
law is taught in the classroom.6 Moreover, since linkage brings
most major areas of global social concern into the ambit of trade
law and institutions, linkage issues, and, through them, the inter-
national trading system, will have a far-reaching impact on the fu-
ture of global social policy generally.
The opening keynote address at the conference, presented by
Frieder Roessler, concedes that linkage issues have always played a
role in trade law and policy, but issues a cogent challenge to pro-
ponents of linkage rule making: Justify the utility of the linkage
exercise from the point of view of both the social goals and values
at stake in the linked area, and the well-being and efficiency of the
trading system itself. Based on a historical analysis of several rec-
ognized links within the GATT/WTO system, such as trade and
development and trade and competition, Roessler argues that, in
each case, accepting the linkage in the GATT/WTO system re-
sulted in the adoption of policy measures that were sub-optimal in
terms of the linked areas and posed a risk to the trading system.
According to Roessler, the burden of proof lies with proponents
of current and future linkage candidates, such as trade and the en-
vironment, to explain why those linkages will not operate accord-
ing to the same flawed dynamic because, in Roessler's view, there
is ample reason for concern that they will.7  Accordingly,
Roessler's analysis sounds an important cautionary note that must
be kept in mind with regard to any linkage issue, even if one con-
cludes that the benefits of linkage outweigh the costs and risks in
a given area of social concern.
If one is willing to concede the validity or desirability of trade
linkages to any extent, then a fundamental starting point for
analysis of the linkage phenomenon is the central role which rule
6 The particularfocus of each paper reflects its place among the several panels
representing what organizers believed would be a useful subdivision of the issues
presented: Linkages as Achieved by Rule Making, The Institutional Response to
Linkages, The Trade and' Phenomenon, Democracy and Legitimacy and Teaching
Linkages.
7 Professors Daniel Esty and Ileana Porras delivered additional addresses at
the conference on the topics of NGO participation in the WTO as it relates to
linkage matters, and the role and limits of harmonization as a response to linkage
issues and trade policy generally.
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making will play in legal responses to the social fact of intersect-
ing policy goals and domains, and the critical challenges that will
be posed, by linkage issues, to the already complex task of multi-
lateral formation of international legal rules. Michael P. Ryan
and Samuel K. Murumba, in their respective articles, emphasize
that, because linkage rule making necessarily involves the regula-
tion of areas outside the traditional expertise of trade-
liberalization specialists, linkage rule making must be applied cau-
tiously, in a manner which gives appropriate recognition to the
epistemic and normative particularities of the linked area.8 Ryan
argues that the optimal process for rule making in linkage areas is
knowledge-driven or "function-specific" diplomacy, within the
epistemic base most appropriate to the linked subject area, such as
the World Intellectual Property Organization for intellectual
property matters. Given the fact that effective linkage rules are
likely to be negotiated through the more typical cross-sectoral or
"linkage-bargain" diplomacy common to multi-lateral trade or-
ganizations, such as the GATT/WTO system, the challenge be-
comes how to preserve the benefits of subject-area expertise in
linkage rule making.
Murumba emphasizes the normative context of linkage regula-
tion. He argues that the proliferation of universally-applicable le-
gal standards through contemporary linkage rule-making practices
is defective to the extent that it takes rules and legal processes
that, in their domestic context, are deeply embedded in a social,
normative context and attempts to propound them internation-
ally on the simple basis of a minimalist context, of transactional
similarities and negotiated bargains across social communities. In-
stead, Murumba argues that linkage rule making should be rooted
in a more fundamental trans-social context, a normative universal-
ity based on the roots of linkage issues (such as intellectual prop-
erty rights in internationally recognized human rights instru-
ments), and that developing such a "justice constituency" would
properly ground international rule making in a global distributive
analysis.
8 Dr. Jonathan Putnam, in a paper not appearing in this symposium issue,
echoes the same concern regarding the contextual roblem in linkage rule making
by arguing that, from an economic perspective, there is an optimum balance of
intellctual property protection in each state, given the state's levels of innovation,
development, and desired rate of growth; muI tilateral linkage rule making in this
area may iot be capable of reaching an agreement that striles the proper balance
for each affected state.
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In another article, C. O'Neal Taylor suggests that behind any
successful exercise in rule making, there is a necessary consensus
on such elements as the core rights to be protected, the nature of
the linkage to trade, and the proper institutional role in rule mak-
ing and enforcement. Taylor argues that the presence or absence
of such a consensus is a determinative factor in why certain link-
ages such as trade and investment are relatively well-received,
while other linkages such as trade and labor rights, encounter
significant resistance.
As the international economic law system becomes increas-
ingly juridical in nature, the likelihood that linkage rules will be
subject to interpretation and adjudication by international eco-
nomic law institutions increases as well. Thus, the impact of
linkage issues is felt not only in the trade rules created and how
they are created, but in the ways in which international economic
law institutions operate and in the reasons to have recourse to
them. 10 In his article, Steve Charnovitz echoes Roessler in recog-
nizing that linkage issues have always been part of trade negotia-
tion and trade regimes, but reaches a different conclusion on the
merits: he suggests that including linkage issues within trade trea-
ties and trade institutions can play a valuable role in furthering in-
ter-governmental cooperation by enhancing the effectiveness of
domestic policies, rebalancing domestic policies, building interna-
tional coalitions, and achieving economies of scale. In another ar-
ticle, Philip M. Nichols focuses more on the study of institutions
which may play important linkage roles, arguing that the focus by
trade scholars on regime theory and institutional economics ig-
nores two other schools of institutionalism, historical institution-
9 Mark A. A. Warner, of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and
Development ("OECD"), delivered a paper also focusing on comparisons between
linkage areas, in particular assessing the role of the OECD in trade and investment
and trade and competition matters.
10 Joel P. Trachtman presented a paper based on his article, Trade and...
Problems, Cost-BenefitAna[ysis and Subsizarit) 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 32 (1997), in
which he surveys existing trade-off mechanisms used by international economic
law institutional dispute settlement mechanisms, such as the following: national
treatment, simple rationality, necessity, less-restrictive alternative, balancing,
proportionality, and cost-benefit analysis. Trachtman concludes that while what
he terms comparative cost-benefit analysis may be the optimal adjudicative
trade-off device, it was unlikely to be adopted by trade institutions. Andrew
Strauss and Elizabeth Zechenter delivered papers focusing on institutional
challenges faced by the WTO in any attempt to address trade and environment
and trade and human rights issues, drawing in Zechenter's case on anthropological
studies of rights enforcement in tracitional societies.
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alism and sociological institutionalism, which suggest important
historical and sociological limits on the range of options an insti-
tution may effectively choose in its response to linkage issues and
trade policy generally.
In addition to its effects on the nature and formation of trade
rules and the role of trade institutions, the linkage phenomenon
calls for a reconsideration of the basic nature of international eco-
nomic law. Jeffrey L. Dunoff challenges his audience to consider
how linkages call into question the assumptions underlying the
dominant economic efficiency model of international economic
law, as well as those underlying the influential game theoretic and
political science models, suggesting that linkage issues presage a
reformulation of our basic conceptions of the trade regulation en-
deavor. Elaborating on a theme touched on by Murumba and
Isabella D. Bunn, among others, my article focuses on the inevita-
ble normativity of linkage issues, suggesting that the "trade and"
phenomenon reveals the link between international economic law
and the traditional concept of justice, and that principles of justice
underlie any linkage claim and any claim in international eco-
nomic law generally. Arthur E. Appleton and Raj Bhala both fo-
cus on particular linkages, telecommunications services and na-
tional security, respectively, analyzing what each linkage reveals
about the linkage phenomenon generally and discussing future
developments in trade policy. Appleton notes the relative success
which "sectoral" linkages such as telecommunications have had
when compared to "social policy" linkages such as labor; however
he argues that even sectoral linkages can play unexpected roles in
advancing certain related social values, such as the role which tele-
communications trade can play in the development of an in-
formed global society. Bhala examines the problematic link be-
tween trade and national security, as illustrated by his analysis of
the relatively ineffective constraints imposed by GATT Article
XXI on measures justified on national security grounds, suggest-
ing that in areas of overriding domestic social concern, linkage
may consist of little more than institutionalized deference on the
part of trade law."
David Fidler, in a paper not appearing in this symposmm issue, examines
another historic linkage between trade and public health concerns, which
underlies areas of trade law such as sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures, not
traditionally consideredto be linkage areas.
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Owing in part to the centrality of normative issues in linkage
areas, and to the fact that linkage represents numerous conflicts
between trade rules and rules in other areas of social concern with
profound domestic resonance, linkage issues directly raise ques-
tions about the relationship between trade rules and other rules
emerging from legitimate democratic processes, and about the
democracy and legitimacy of the trade regime itself.12  Jeffery
Atik proposes a mechanism for the careful screening of claims
that trade norms and decisions represent anti-democratic out-
comes, in particular because of the risk that democratic rationales
will be advanced for what are essentially efforts to externalize the
costs of domestic policies. He concludes that national measures
advanced with democratic rationales should be entitled to defer-
ence to the extent that such measures are widely endorsed within
their political community, and internalize their economic cost to
the state that is advancing the measure.
In another article, Andrea K. Schneider surveys the principal
models of international dispute resolution, with particular atten-
tion to the rights and status of individuals. Schneider concludes
that international trade dispute resolution must create a larger
role for individual participation if it intends to more effectively
accomplish its goals, embody the commitment to liberal interna-
tionalism, and respond to serious charges about its legitimacy.'
3
Not surprisingly, new issues and newly relevant disciplines
call for changes in how international economic law in general,
and linkage issues in particular, are taught. Linkage issues not
only introduce many new substantive areas-such as public
health, environmental science, and competition law-into the ba-
sic trade curriculum, but also suggest the relevance, if not indis-
pensability, of disciplines-such as anthropology and political and
12 Democracy and legitimacy issues have become increasingly important in
international economic law and international law generally, in particular due to
the pathbreaking work of Thomas Franck. See, e.g., THOMAS FRANCK, THE
POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990); Robert F. Housman, Democ-
ratizing International Trade Decisionmaking 27 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 699 (1994);
Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L
L. 46 (1992).
13 Paul Stephan, in a paper not appearing in this symposium issue, analyzes
the Helms-Burtonlaw as an exercise in rebellion by the United States that may be
justifiable because it operates as a check on norm creation at the multilateral level,
thus in effect reinforcing its own legitimacy. Sol Picciotto and Gregory Schaffer
delivered papers examining the MAI and the WTO as they relate to the
effectiveness and legitimacy of global governance.
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moral philosophy-which have not been emphasized in tradi-
tional approaches to teaching international economic law.
Spencer Weber Waller offers a pedagogic model based on simula-
tions which he has used with considerable success in his efforts to
teach linkage issues as part of a general course in international
trade law. Bunn, continuing the theme of the normativity of
linkage issues, offers concrete suggestions on how courses in in-
ternational economic law might incorporate the insights of ethical
theory.
Due largely to the success of the "international economic law
revolution," as chronicled in part by the University of Pennsylva-
nia Journal of International Economic Law,14 contemporary inter-
national economic law is undergoing a process of thorough ree-
valuation within domestic and international political
constituencies and academic and policy circles alike. The many
"trade and" debates currently underway are a critical part of this
examination, and suggest the range of issues to be addressed in the
international economic law of the twenty-first century. The con-
ference organizers would like to express their thanks to the sym-
posium authors, other conference participants, Charlotte Ku and
Sandra Leibel of the ASIL staff, and the staff of the University of
Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law for their help
in preparing and producing this contribution towards that proc-
ess.
14 See, e.g., Joel P. Trachtman, The International Economic Law Revolution,
17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 33, 33-61 (1996) (discussing the change in name of
this journal and pointing out that "economic organization includes more than
business").
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